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Abstract— Based on the analysis of a specific relay model and an 
HVAC (High Voltage Alternating Current) cable system, a new 
approach to EMTDC/PSCAD modelling of protective relays is 
presented.  Such approach allows to create complex and accurate 
relay models derived from the original algorithms. Relay models 
can be applied with various systems, allowing to obtain the most 
optimal configuration of the protective relaying. The present 
paper describes modelling methodology on the basis of Siemens 
SIPROTEC 4 7SD522/610. Relay model was verified 
experimentally with its real equivalent by both EMTP-simulated 
and real world generated current signals connected to the relay. 
Keywords— line differential protection; XLPE HVAC cable; 
EMTDC/PSCAD relay model;  SIPROTEC 4 7SD522; 7SD610 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Relay computer modelling is an important issue for 
establishing proper protection scheme for the specified system.  
Nowadays, it is difficult to obtain accurate relay computer 
model, since relay manufacturers offer their products with a 
variety of algorithms and features that may significantly 
change operation of relays under specific conditions and states.  
For this purpose, essential study over new approach for 
creating relay models in EMTDC/PSCAD is given. The 
methodology relies on obtained relay’s technical specification 
(given by relays manufacturer), so that unique features and 
algorithms - characteristic for each relay type, can be 
developed. As a result, this would give complex relay model 
narrowed and useful only for specified type of relay. In 
compensation, relay computer model would be very accurate 
(mainly in terms of sensitivity and operating speed) with easy 
and user-friendly configuration panel, which is programmed 
with the same parameter values as in real devices.  
Established relay models would easily allow to perform 
simulations of chosen study cases and examine possibilities of 
unwanted tripping that might occur (e.g. due to transient power 
electronics switching, overvoltages, external faults, 
energization states, etc.).  
This paper presents such analysis for Siemens line 
differential relays SIPROTEC 4 SD522/610, as these relays are 
planned to protect HVAC underground transmission cable 
system built in Denmark in years 2012-2014.  
Large capacitance of underground cables in comparison to 
overhead lines brings original issues for the differential 
protection scheme to consider, as both steady and transient 
states have to be deeply analyzed. For steady state, charging 
current is the factor that mostly affects relays function. For 
transient states, relays may be affected by inrush currents that 
occur due to shunt reactors switching operations (necessary for 
reactive power compensation).  
In order to properly reflect cable system’s influence over 
relay’s current signals in mentioned states, cable system is 
modelled with the usage of EMTDC/PSCAD software, as it 
provides satisfactory accuracy for both steady and transient 
analysis. 
When both cable system and protection scheme models are 
completed, relay model’s accuracy can be finally verified 
through experimental testing. Having identical parameter 
setting both for relay model and real device, sensitivity and 
operating speed are compared thus showing high accuracy of 
the relay model. 
Results from experimental analysis prove that presented 
approach for relay modelling can be successfully adapted for 
specific relays with original algorithms and features. 
II. PROTECTED CABLE SYSTEM - BACKGROUND 
A. Cable System - Description 
The single phase diagram of total cable system is shown on 
Fig. 1.  
Figure 1.  Schematic Representation of  the Underground 420 kV Cable 
System. 
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 The system consists of the following components: 
1) XLPE HVAC Underground Cable Sections (L1–L2): 
Selected cable is made of three aluminium single-core cables 
buried underground on the depth of 1,3 m and laid in a flat 
formation within 300 mm from each other. Total cable is 
divided into two sections of lengths accordingly 28 km and 
29,5 km. Metallic screens of each cable section are cross-
bonded approximately each 2 km, and earthed each 6 km. 
Detailed information about cable structure is presented on 
table I. 
TABLE I.  TECHNICAL DATA OF XLPE UNDERGROUND 420 KV CABLE 
Description Value 
Cross-section of conductor (mm2) 1600 
Diameter of conductor (mm) 52 
Insulation thickness (mm) 27,0 
Diameter over insulation (mm) 110,0 
Cross-section of screen (mm2) 185 
Outer diameter of cable (mm) 127,0 
Capacitance (µF/km) 0,21 
Inductance (mH/km) 0,50 
Charging current per phase (A/km) 14,9 
 
2) Shunt Reactor Banks (SR1–SR4): For reactive power 
compensation, four switchable shunt reactors are installed; 
each on ASV, KYV bus bars with reactive power of 100 
MVARs and two between cable sections with reactive power 
of 140 MVARs. 
3) Supply Sources (ES1–ES2): Power system on both sides 
of the cable is modelled by ES1 and ES2 sources that are 
Thevenin equivalents consisting of voltage sources and its 
short-circuit impedances. Parameter values are listed on table 
II. 
TABLE II.  TECHNICAL DATA OF CABLE’S SUPPLY SOURCES 
Supply Source 
Voltage 
(kV) 
Short-circuit impedance 
(Ω) 
ES1 420 0.829 + j16.60 
ES2 420 0.839 + j16.78 
 
B. EMTDC/PSCAD Model of Cable System 
In Fig. 2, described cable system is modelled in 
EMTDC/PSCAD software by frequency dependent (phase) 
model, giving highest accuracy among other available models 
[5]. Such modelled cable system may accurately reflect 
behaviour of the protection scheme under various transient 
states that are likely to appear. Further detailed information 
about establishing computer model of the cable is available in 
[5]. 
 Shunt reactors are modelled with series resistance and 
inductance parameter values for each phase. 
Figure 2.  EMTDC/PSCAD Representation of the Underground 420 kV 
Cable System. 
Table III shows validation results for three possible currents 
that can flow through protected cable. Parameters were chosen  
that  mostly affect proper function of established differential 
protection. Detailed methodology for cable model validation 
along with series of calculations are given in [1-3]. 
TABLE III.  VALIDATION RESULTS FOR EMTDC/PSCAD UNDERGROUND 
CABLE MODEL 
Description 
Theoretical 
Analysis  
EMTDC/PSCAD 
Model  
Relative 
error er 
(%) 
Maximum Charging 
Current (kA) 0,878 0,805 8,3 
External Fault at ASV 
substation (kA) 9,555 11,49 16 
Internal Fault in the 
middle of the cable (kA) 11,85 12,94 8,4 
Relative error is calculated from er = 100· |ITA - IPSCAD| / ITA, where: ITA – current parameter value 
obtained algebraically; IPSCAD – current parameter value obtained numerically. 
Relative error originates from cable geometry, since mutual 
couplings between internal conductive cable layers take place. 
This corresponds to core conductors and screens that are in 
close proximity to each other. Resulting inductive reactance for 
single phase is lower than calculated algebraically, thus giving 
higher current value which rises significantly when high 
currents flow through cable [2]. 
Validation results allow to conclude that certain error level 
occurs and has to be taken into account. Higher fault current 
values from  EMTDC/PSCAD simulations allow to keep 
safety margin for the analysis based on simulation results. 
C. Differential Protection Scheme – Description 
Total differential protection scheme for the analyzed cable 
system is presented in Fig. 3. 
Figure 3.  Schematic Representation of the Differential Protection Scheme 
over Underground 420 kV Cable System. 
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Proposed protection scheme consists of following 
components: 
1) Current Transformers (CT): Devices responsible for 
current signal transformation on the level applicable for 
measuring instruments installed in protection relays. Table IV 
shows current transformers specification used for computer 
modelling purpose. 
TABLE IV.  TECHNICAL DATA OF CURRENT TRANSFORMERS (CT) 
Parameter Value 
CT manufacturer’s model ABB  IMB 420 
CT class 5P 
Transfomation ratio (A/A) 1000/1 
Accuracy Limit Factor – ALF 100 
Nominal Power (VA) 15 
 
2) Mono-mode Fibre Optic Cables (FO): Communication 
channels responsible for proper signal transmission between 
relays. Due to significant length of the protected cable (58,5 
km), signal attenuation phenomenon must be considered along 
with time delay between sending and reaching signal from 
both sides of the protected cable. Reference [2] explains 
detailed solution methodology to stated issues. Channel time 
delay is calculated based on datasheet provided by fibre optic 
cable’s and relay’s manufacturers. Necessary data are gathered 
in table V. 
TABLE V.  TECHNICAL DATA OF FIBRE OPTIC CABLES (FO) 
Index Parameter Value 
vB Bandwidth Data Speed (bits/s) 512 
lFO FO Length (km) 58,5 
vFO FO Speed of Light (km/s) 200000 
lB HDLC Frame Length (bits) 200 
 
Channel time delay Tdelay is 1,07 ms, calculated from 
 
B
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B
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v
l
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TTTT ++=++= ,  (1) 
where 
Ts – time for sending signal by the local relay, 
Tt – time for transmitting signal through FO cable, 
Tr – time for receiving signal by the remote relay. 
3) Line Differential Relays (DR): Most complex 
components realizing signal measurement, signal comparison 
and finally - fault detection principles. Relays analyzed in this 
paper are Siemens SIPROTEC 4 7SD522. Detailed technical 
specification, instruction on establishing proper configuration 
parameter set are available in [1], [3] and [4]. 
D. EMTDC/PSCAD Model of Differential Protection Scheme 
A general approach is introduced for protection scheme 
modelling in PSCAD software.  
Based on previous components description, their unique 
characteristic functions are presented on Fig. 4.  Each 
component is responsible for: 
Figure 4.  EMTDC/PSCAD Representation of the Differential Protection 
Scheme over Underground 420 kV Cable System. 
• Signal transformation, modelled by Current 
Transformer Lucas model blocks with specified 
parameter settings. Reference [6] provides more 
information regarding CT Lucas model.  
• Signal transmission, modelled by time delay blocks 
with specified and calculated time delay value from 
(1). 
• Signal processing, modelled with complex block 
combination, reflecting operation algorithm and 
original features of real relays. 
III. EMTDC/PSCAD RELAY MODELLING 
Relay EMTDC/PSCAD computer model is created in a 
shape of box with three phase modules included, so that all 
operations are phase segregated as in real relays (see Fig. 7). 
Input signals for modules are previously sampled with sampler 
blocks, so that 20 sampled values appear each full cycle period  
(fixed frequency) [3]. Output logic signal B1 is responsible for 
controlling line circuit breaker in case of possible fault 
occurrence. Following features are included in each phase 
module: 
1) Sample Acquisition: Operation necessary for further 
phasor and charge computations. Sample values in have to be 
stored during full cycle. This operation is available by 
implementing 20 Sample/Hold blocks – each controlled by 
logic pulse generator block, as presented on Fig. 5. Pulse 
generator blocks give command D for each sample/hold block. 
Generated pulses are shifted to each other by 18 degrees of 
total cycle period. 
Figure 5.  EMTDC/PSCAD Representation of Sample Acquisition 
Technique. 
 
phasor_Ma1 D
+
F
+
Y
X
M X
P Y
M
P
Y
X
M X
P Y
M
P
phasor_Pa1
D
+
F
+ D
+
F
+
X
2
X
2 X
phasor_Ma2
phasor_Pa2 IopA_phasordyta
Low pass
Butterwth
Order = 1
Sampler
a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
b) 
B
+
D
+
F
+
*
*
IresA_phasor
phasor_Ma1
phasor_Ma2
A
B Compar-
ator
A
B Compar-
ator
Idiffx
P1
P1
[Main] Idiffx 
[Main] Idiffx2 
Edge
Detector
A
B
Ctrl
Ctrl = 1
Idiffx2
Idiffx2
Mono-
T
stable
A
B
Ctrl
Ctrl = 1
EN_1
[Main] EN_1 
A
B Compar-
ator
P1
phasor_Ma2 P3
P1 ≥ phasor_Ma1     P1 < phasor_Ma1 
 A
B Compar-
ator
P1
phasor_Ma2 P2
 
2) Phasor Measurement: current phasor values I are 
obtained in the shape of complex numbers through Discrete 
Fourier Transform technique, based on 
 CS IjII ⋅+= ,  (2) 
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Herein are 
n = 1,2,…,20  –  sample number, 
in  –  current sample value corresponding to sample n, 
ω = 2⋅f⋅π  –  cycle pulsation, 
∆t = (f ⋅ N)-1  –  sample time interval, 
f = 50 Hz  –  frequency, 
N = 20  –  number of samples over one cycle. 
Equations (3) and (4) are realized by correlating sample 
values with sine and cosine waveforms and summating them 
each full cycle period [1]. 
3) Charge Measurement: Charge values Q are obtained 
based on 
 i
n
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n
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i tidtiQ ∆
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+
+
+
=
.  (5) 
Four charge values are calculated each full cycle period. By 
applying signal switch block, final charge signal is switched 
each quarter cycle. This corresponds to real relay feature, 
where charge comparison is performed four times more often 
than phasor comparison. 
4) Phasor Comparison: based on relay’s principles given 
in [1], values for operational phasor IOP and restraint phasor 
IRES are obtained and relay operating criterion is 
 RESOP II > ,  (6) 
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Relay setting parameters P1, P2, P3 and Idiff> are chosen 
based on procedure given in [3] and [4]. Parameters I1 and I2 
are current phasor values correspondingly measured by local 
and remote relays. Operation of switching multiplying factors 
for restraint phasor (determined by current signal value – in 
fault state or load state) is made with the usage of comparator 
blocks, which output signal is multiplied by its corresponding 
actual phasor current signal value, as shown on Fig. 6.  
Based on information obtained from the position of line 
circuit breaker installed on the same side as device, differential 
relay can detect “dead line” state when no current flows 
through the protected cable. Cable energization state – when 
circuit breaker is suddenly switched on – is detected by Edge 
Detector block by positive transition appearance of signal from 
line circuit breakers. This allows generating digital impulse, 
which is later extended to the specified time interval - Td 
setting, which can be changed based on relay settings by 
Monostable Multivibrator block. 
Figure 6.  EMTDC/PSCAD Representation of Phasor Comparison technique: 
a) Restraint phasor IRES, b) Operational phasor IOP. 
5) Charge Comparison: for this technique, the same 
algorithm is used as for phasor comparison. Idiff> parameter is 
replaced with minimum threshold value for charges: Idiff>>. In 
addition, phasor signals are replaced with their corresponding 
operational QOP and restraint QRES charge values. 
6) Signal Filtering: operational and restraint values are 
filtered using low-pass Butterworth filter block with 
established frequency threshold corresponding to each 
comparison technique. 
7) Inrush Restraint: 2nd harmonic phasor currents I2nd are 
measured by online frequency scanner blocks. If its values 
exceed established ratio kratio of 1st harmonic I1st, relay 
prevents tripping operation. In EMTDC/PSCAD model this 
feature can be switched OFF as in real relays. Condition 
statement (9) has to be fulfilled in order to activate inrush 
restraint blocking feature. Upper limit for non-tripping 
operation is established with Imax_peak parameter 
 ( ) ( )peakmax_ststrationd IIIkI <∧⋅> 112 .  (9) 
Comparison principles are obtained with a combination of 
comparator blocks. Output signals from comparators can then 
 
cross_A
cross_A
cross_B
PHASE C
A
B
Ctrl
Ctrl = 1
1
EN_1
EN_1
SAMPLER
PHASE A
PHASE B
cross_B
cross_C
cross_C
trip_C
trip_B
trip_B
trip_C
SAMPLER
SAMPLER
trip_Atrip_A
B1
 
PHASE_C : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.0 
3.0 
6.0 
9.0 
12.0 
15.0 
A
IopC_phasor IresC_phasor IopC_charge IresC_charge
PHASE_B_1 : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.0 
3.0 
6.0 
9.0 
12.0 
15.0 
A
IopB_phasor IresB_phasor IopB_charge IresB_charge
PHASE_A_1 : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.0 
3.0 
6.0 
9.0 
12.0 
15.0 
A
IopA_phasor IresA_phasor QopA_charge QresA_charge
PHASE_C : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 
0.0 
6.0 
12.0 
18.0 
24.0 
30.0 
36.0 
42.0 
48.0 
54.0 
60.0 
66.0 
A
IopC_phasor IresC_phasor
PHASE_B_1 : Graphs
 0.00  0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 
0.0 
6.0 
12.0 
18.0 
24.0 
30.0 
36.0 
42.0 
48.0 
54.0 
60.0 
66.0 
A
IopB_phasor IresB_phasor
PHASE_A_1 : Graphs
 0. 00 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 
0.0 
6.0 
12.0 
18.0 
24.0 
30.0 
36.0 
42.0 
48.0 
54.0 
60.0 
66.0 
A
IopA_phasor IresA_phasor
●
 re
st
ra
in
t p
ha
so
r I
R
E
S
  │
 ●
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l p
ha
so
r I
O
P
 
  
 C
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
) 
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
) 
  
  
  
  
  
A
 p
h
a
se
 (
A
) 
 
● 
re
st
ra
in
t c
ha
rg
e 
Q
R
E
S
  │
 ●
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l c
ha
rg
e 
Q
O
P
 
  
  
 C
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
·s
) 
  
  
  
 B
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
·s
) 
  
  
  
 A
 p
h
a
se
 (
A
·s
) 
  
  
 
 
a)          b) 
Time (s)     Time (s) 
 
IRES IOP 
QRES 
QOP 
 
 
PHASE_C : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
A
IopC_phasor IresC_phasor IopC_charge IresC_charge
PHASE_B_1 : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
A
IopB_phasor IresB_phasor IopB_charge IresB_charge
PHASE_A_1 : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 0.320 0.360 0.400 0.440 0.480  ...
 ...
 ...
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
4.50 
5.00 
A
IopA_phasor IresA_phasor QopA_charge QresA_charge
PHASE_C : Graphs
 00 04 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.0 
25.0 
30.0 
35.0 
40.0 
A
IopC_phasor IresC_phasor IopC_charge
PHASE_B_1 : Graphs
 0.000 0.040 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.0 
25.0 
30.0 
35.0 
40.0 
A
IopB_phasor IresB_phasor IopB_charge
PHASE_A_1 : Graphs
 0. 00 0. 40 0.080 0.120 0.160 0.200 0.240 0.280 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
15.0 
20.0 
25.0 
30.0 
35.0 
40.0 
A
IopA_phasor IresA_phasor QopA_charge
● 
re
st
ra
in
t p
ha
so
r I
R
E
S
  │
 ●
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l p
ha
so
r I
O
P
 
  
 C
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
) 
  
  
  
  
  
 B
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
) 
  
  
  
  
  
A
 p
h
a
se
 (
A
) 
 
● 
re
st
ra
in
t c
ha
rg
e 
Q
R
E
S
  │
 ●
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l c
ha
rg
e 
Q
O
P
 
  
  
 C
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
·s
) 
  
  
  
 B
 p
h
a
se
  
(A
·s
) 
  
  
  
 A
 p
h
a
se
 (
A
·s
) 
  
  
 
 
a)          b) 
Time (s)     Time (s) 
IRES 
IOP QRES 
QOP 
be combined with logic gates so that tripping signal depends on 
the resulting signal from the inrush restraint feature. 
8) Cross-blocking: in order to prevent tripping signals 
from all three phases when inrush feature is active in only 
single phase, cross-blocking feature is introduced. Its PSCAD 
representation is shown on Fig. 7. 
Figure 7.  EMTDC/PSCAD Representation of Cross-Blocking Technique. 
In EMTDC/PSCAD computer model, cross-blocking 
utilizes single phase tripping and inrush activation signals as 
the output signals of each phase module. Combining them all 
with logic gates gives final tripping signal decision B1. Hence, 
described feature has to be implemented outside phase 
modules. As in real relays, feature can be permanently 
switched OFF during normal operation.  
Original EMTDC/PSCAD files with fully established and 
configured models of relays and protected cable system are 
available at main author on request. 
IV. EMTDC/PSCAD SIMULATION CASES 
A. Two-Phase External Fault at KYV substation 
External fault simulation in phases A and B allows analysis 
on how relay computer model reacts when high currents flow 
through the protected cable. Fault is cleared after 55 ms by 
virtual bus protection installed in place where fault occurred. 
All shunt reactors are disconnected (highest charging current). 
Simulation graphs are presented on Fig. 8. 
Figure 8.  External Fault State at 10 ms: a) Phasor Comparison Technique, b) 
Charge Comparison Technique. 
Due to high currents flowing through phases A and B 
which are higher than calculated P1 value [4], transition takes 
place resulting in switching multiplying factors from P2 to P3 
value. This means that transformed secondary current lies 
within fault area and security margin is increased in 
corresponding phases. On presented plots, restraint threshold is 
higher for the time when external fault current flows. After 
fault clearing, restraint values return to its normal threshold 
levels since transformed current lies once again within load 
area. An increase of operational values in phases with high 
current appears after fault clearing, giving large safety margin 
in order to prevent unwanted tripping. It is seen that during 
whole simulation operational values do not exceed restraint 
ones. As a result, relay properly does not detect any fault 
within protected cable and does not send tripping signal. 
B. Single-Phase Intenal Fault at KYV substation 
Simulation test involves internal fault appearance in phase 
A within protected cable. As the worst case scenario, single A-
phase fault is applied with high resistance Rfault = 20 Ω and all 
shunt reactors are switched ON (lowest charging current). 
Computer model with established setting parameters should be 
able to properly detect and recognize fault state within phases. 
Figure 9 presents described simulation case results . 
Figure 9.  Internal Fault State at 10 ms: a) Phasor Comparison Technique, b) 
Charge Comparison Technique. 
As expected, internal fault occurred in A phase and is 
detected by relay computer model both with phasor and charge 
comparison techniques. Operational values significantly exceed 
restraint ones after 20 ms from fault occurrence for phasor and 
15ms for charge comparison principles. Earlier fault detection 
with charge technique results in sending tripping signal after 
15ms in order to disconnect faulted cable. 
V. RELAY TESTING  
A. Description 
Relay experimental testing is possible with the usage of 
modern equipment and software capable of converting current 
signals from EMTDC/PSCAD software into current 
waveforms injected into real differential relays. Simplified 
diagram of experimental test setup is presented on Fig. 10. 
UDC supply 
Ia11 
Ib11  
Ic11 
FO cable 
DIGSI 4.81 
Advanced Transplay 
UDC supply 
Ia22 
Ib22  
Ic22 
 
 
Figure 10.  Experimental Test Setup. 
Six current signals are sent: Ia11, Ib11, Ic11, Ia22, Ib22, 
Ic22 from which three enter to each relay accordingly to the 
side from which they were measured. Relays interconnected 
together with fibre optic cable, respond based on delivered 
signals with measured values and annunciation messages saved 
as logs. These logs can then be sent to PC and read in DIGSI 
software for further analysis and for comparison purposes.  
B. Results 
All tests from experimental analysis and EMTDC/PSCAD 
simulations were performed with the same setting parameter 
values. Relay’s operating speed and sensitivity have been 
examined.   
1) Operating Speed: Operating speed analysis gives idea 
on how fast relay is able to detect fault states.  By the analysis 
of restraint/operational plots in EMTDC/PSCAD computer 
software, time interval between exceeding threshold by 
operational charge value QOP and phasor value IOP can be 
compared with the ones obtained from DIGSI logs. Analyzed 
study case results are presented on table VI.  
TABLE VI.  VALIDATION RESULTS OF OPERATING SPEED FOR 
EMTDC/PSCAD RELAY MODEL 
Time interval (ms) 
Case description Experimental 
Results 
PSCAD 
Simulation Results 
Single-phase to ground internal 
fault in the middle 8 14 
Single-phase to ground internal 
fault at KYV busbar 8 14 
Two-phase to ground internal 
fault at KYV busbar 14  │  14 15  │  15 
Three-phase to ground internal 
fault KYV busbar 18  │  12  │  18 15  │  10  │  15 
 
2) Sensitivity: Relay’s sensitivity analysis is critical for 
proper internal fault states recognition. For this reason, 
internal faults with very high resistance values were analyzed. 
Differential threshold parameter Idiff> for phasor comparison 
was adjusted in order to obtain its critical threshold values. 
Results are listed and compared in table VII. Phasor 
comparison is examined since it is more sensitive and 
necessary for proper fault detection. Critical values are these 
on which relay still detects fault and - if increased of a single 
setting step -  makes no reaction for the same fault conditions. 
 
TABLE VII.  VALIDATION RESULTS OF SENSITIVITY FOR EMTDC/PSCAD 
RELAY MODEL 
Differential phasor Idiff> 
threshold for tripping 
Differential phasor Idiff> 
threshold for non-tripping 
Internal 
fault 
resistance 
(Ω) 
Experimental 
Results 
PSCAD 
Simulation 
Results 
Experimental 
Results 
PSCAD 
Simulation 
Results 
55 4,02 4,05 4,03 4,06 
70 3,23 3,25 3,24 3,26 
145 1,72 1,73 1,73 1,74 
210 1,31 1,32 1,32 1,33 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
EMTDC/PSCAD relay computer model proves to be 
reliable and efficient from taken simulation cases with 
established parameter set. Apart from internal and external 
fault states, analyzed simulation cases included transmission 
cable’s energization and shunt reactor’s energization states, 
giving overall 10 different study cases [2]. All simulation 
results have been successfully compliant with the expected 
ones.  
According to simulation results, relay model is able to 
accurately detect internal faults and differentiate them with 
mentioned other states that may be misleading. Very high fault 
resistances from which relay cannot detect faults marks 
efficiency of specific algorithms implemented and used for 
measurement and comparison purposes of the obtained signals. 
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